The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 34 (2006)

Article 3

Political Litigation and the Role of the Court
Grant Huscroft

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Huscroft, Grant. "Political Litigation and the Role of the Court." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases
Conference 34. (2006).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol34/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Political Litigation and
the Role of the Court
Grant Huscroft*

I. INTRODUCTION
Fear of “politicizing the court” has always been the primary argument
against reforming the judicial appointment process, and in particular the
process of appointing the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. As
arguments opposing change go, it is a good one: no one favours
politicization. On the contrary, everyone is sure that politicization would
be a bad thing, and that we should do all that we can to avoid it.
The trouble is that “politicization” has no inherent meaning, and no
definition is usually proffered. Courts engaged in the business of
constitutional judicial review are necessarily engaged in politics, and the
highest courts are the most political of all: not only do their decisions
inform the political agenda for the elected branch of government, they
shape the constitutional order itself.
In this paper I want to discuss two recent decisions involving highly
important and highly politicized issues. In Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage1 the Court had no choice but to hear a reference from the
federal government, but it decided not to decide whether limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples was constitutional, the only serious
question in dispute. Conversely, in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney
General),2 the Court chose to hear the appeal, only to fail to reach a
majority decision on the constitutionality of Quebec’s health care
legislation. Both cases are revealing of the way in which the Court
perceives its role — in particular its relationship with the executive and
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Faculty of Law, The University of Western Ontario. Thanks to James Allan, Richard
Ekins, Randal Graham, Joanna Harrington and Paul Rishworth, who commented on earlier drafts,
and Cameron MacDonald, who provided research assistance.
1
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 [hereinafter “Marriage Reference”].
2
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
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legislative branches of government, and thus its place in the
constitutional order.
1. The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage
The Marriage Reference is one of the most nakedly political cases in
which the Court has been involved,3 and the way in which the Court
handled the reference is more important than most commentators have
noted.4
I have outlined the background to this reference in another context,
so will provide only a brief summary here.5 The federal government
defended the common law definition limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples when challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms6 were brought by same-sex couples seeking marriage licences
in several provinces. This position was in accordance with the wishes of
Parliament, which in 1999 reaffirmed its commitment to the traditional
definition of marriage.7 Courts in Quebec and British Columbia held
that the traditional definition of marriage infringed the equality
guarantee in the Charter, but those courts suspended their declarations
of unconstitutionality in order to allow Parliament to address the
situation.8 A committee of Parliament was considering the matter, and
had held hearings across the country.
3
In rejecting the argument that the reference questions were not justiciable, the Court noted,
id., at para. 11 that: “The political underpinnings of the instant reference are indisputable”, but added
that politics was only a contextual consideration, and did not colour the substance of the matter.
4
John McEvoy is one of few scholars in Canada to have expressed any interest in the
reference power. See McEvoy, “Separation of Powers and the Reference Power: Is There a Right to
Refuse?” (1988) 10 S.C.L.R. (2d) 429, and McEvoy, “Refusing to Answer: The Supreme Court and
the Reference Power Revisited” (2005) 54 U.N.B.L.J. 29 [McEvoy, “Refusing to Answer”]. I am
grateful to the author for providing me with a copy of the latter paper. Jamie Cameron discusses the
Marriage Reference in “2004: A Year of Mixed Messages From the Court” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)
15, at 18-21 [Cameron, “Mixed Messages”].
5
A fuller account is found in Grant Huscroft, “Thank God We’re Here: Judicial
Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation and its Consequences” (2004) 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 241, at 255-63
[Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”].
6
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
7
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1 [repealed S.C.
2005, c. 3, s. 15].
8
Hendricks c. Québec (Procureur général), [2002] J.Q. no 3816 (Sup. Ct.), vard [2004]
J.Q. no 2593 (C.A.); EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 994, 13
B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 (C.A.) [hereinafter “EGALE”]. The Ontario Divisional Court had also suspended
its declaration of unconstitutionality in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] O.J. No.
2714, 60 O.R. (3d) 321 (Div. Ct.).
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The government might well have anticipated that it would lose in
pending litigation in the Ontario Court of Appeal, but I doubt that it
anticipated that Court’s decision in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney
General)9 to give its declaration of unconstitutionality immediate effect.
The practice of suspending controversial Charter rulings had become
more generous than the Supreme Court’s decision in Schachter v.
Canada10 contemplated, and the government had every reason to believe
that this practice would be followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, in
line with the decisions of courts in other provinces. Halpern changed the
dynamic considerably, both legally and politically.
Marriages began to take place immediately following that Court’s
decision, thus creating a new status quo. The government announced
that it would not be appealing the decision in Halpern; instead, it would
be introducing legislation to change the definition of marriage, thus
extending the result in Halpern across the country. First, however, the
government would be referring its proposed legislation to the Supreme
Court of Canada for its advice.
(a) Three Reference Questions
The government’s reference raised three questions:
1. Is the proposed legislation within the exclusive legislative authority
of Parliament?
2. Is same-sex marriage consistent with the Charter?
3. Are religious officials protected from compulsion to perform samesex marriage by the freedom of religion guarantee?
It is important to emphasize that none of these questions was
seriously in dispute.11 The government knew that Parliament possessed
exclusive legislative authority in regard to marriage capacity; the parties

9

[2003] O.J. No. 2268, 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Halpern”].
[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679. See Bruce Ryder’s critique of subsequent
practice in “Suspending the Charter” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 267.
11
Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”, supra, note 5, at 257-58.
10
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to the litigation conceded as much.12 The government knew that
permitting same-sex marriage was consistent with the Charter; the
litigation had concerned the question whether precluding same-sex
marriage was consistent with the Charter. The third question had not
arisen in the marriage litigation. It was included in the reference in the
expectation that the Court would provide an affirmative answer, and so
assuage fears about the impact of the proposed change in the law. In
sum, no one doubted that Parliament could legislate a new definition of
marriage if it chose to do so. The decision to refer these questions to the
Supreme Court of Canada was designed to delay Parliament from
dealing with the legislation, thus taking the issue off the political table
in the short run. The only meaningful question was whether or not the
traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage infringed the Charter, but
the government did not refer this question, and in fact did all that it
could to preclude this question from being answered by the Supreme
Court. Not only did it not appeal the decision in Halpern, it insisted that
no other group should be granted standing to do so.13
(b) Adding a Fourth Question
The retirement of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the assumption of
leadership by Prime Minister Paul Martin saw the appointment of a new
Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, and a revision of the government’s
strategy. Before the case could be argued, the government added a
fourth question to the reference, this one raising the very question that
appeared to have died with the government’s decision not to appeal the
decision in Halpern. Specifically, the government asked whether the

12

Justice Pitfield in the B.C. Supreme Court appears to have been the only one to think
otherwise. He held that same-sex marriage was barred by the Constitution Act, 1867 on the basis
that the concept of marriage was constitutionally fixed: EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2001] B.C.J. No. 1995, 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122 (S.C.). But both the B.C. Attorney General
and the Attorney General for Canada agreed that capacity to marry falls within Parliament’s
exclusive jurisdiction under s. 91(26), and the B.C. Court of Appeal agreed: EGALE, at para. 10
(S.C.), supra, note 8, at para. 62 (C.A.), following Halpern.
In one minor respect, the Supreme Court held that the legislation overstepped federal competence.
The Court held that a declaratory provision (“Nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials of
religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious
beliefs”) was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament on the basis that “a federal
provision seeking to ensure that the Act within which it is situated is not interpreted so as to trench
on provincial powers can have no effect and is superfluous” (supra, note 1, at para. 38).
13
[2003] S.C.C.A. No. 337.
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traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage is consistent with the
Charter. The addition of this question allowed opponents of same-sex
marriage to have the “day in court” they sought but further delayed the
Court in dealing with the reference, thus buying the government
additional time in which to hold an election without Parliament having
to debate the proposed legislation.
The government’s performance was disingenuous, to say the least. It
pretended that same-sex marriage was a judicial issue even as it
proposed to legislate, and attempted to rely on the reference proceedings
for political cover. At the same time, the government did all that it could
to ensure that it received the answer it wanted on the fourth question. It
conceded the unconstitutionality of the traditional definition of marriage
in litigation in other provinces and territories that continued while the
reference was pending. The lower courts obliged with declarations of
unconstitutionality, and by the time the Supreme Court decided the
reference case courts in seven provinces and territories had declared that
the traditional definition of marriage was unconstitutional. Thousands of
same-sex couples had been married as a result. The government had,
through its litigation strategy, established a new status quo that the
Court was unlikely to disturb, even if it were dubious about the
unconstitutionality of the traditional definition of marriage.14
(c) The Court’s Advice
When I discussed this situation in 2004, I argued that the Court should
repudiate the government’s political strategy, and I think that is in
essence what the Court’s decision in the Marriage Reference did. But
the Court’s repudiation was implicit rather than explicit: it repudiated
the government’s political strategy by refusing to answer the fourth
question in the reference. Although on the face of things this may seem
an apolitical decision, in fact it is political from top to bottom.
In order to refuse to answer the fourth question, the Court first had
to establish that it had the power to refuse. It had to establish, in other
words, that it is entitled to decide whether or not it will answer
particular reference questions. The problem here is that nothing in the
14
The former Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, has written an account of his government’s
handling of the same-sex marriage issue. See Cotler, “Marriage in Canada — Evolution or
Revolution” (2006) 44 Fam. Ct. Rev. 60 [Cotler, “Evolution or Revolution”]. He does not respond
to any of the points made here, or in Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”, supra, note 5.
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language of the reference power in the Supreme Court Act supports this
position. The relevant provision is section 53:
Referring certain questions for opinion
53(1) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing
and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning
(a) the interpretation of the Constitution Acts;
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or
provincial legislation;
(c) the appellate jurisdiction respecting educational matters, by
the Constitution Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law vested
in the Governor in Council; or
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures
of the provinces, or of the respective governments thereof,
whether or not the particular power in question has been or is
proposed to be exercised.
Other questions
(2) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing
and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning any
matter, whether or not in the opinion of the Court esjudem generis
with the enumerations contained in subsection (1), with reference to
which the Governor in Council sees fit to submit any such question.
Questions deemed important
(3) Any question concerning any of the matters mentioned in
subsections (1) and (2), and referred to the Court by the Governor in
Council, shall be conclusively deemed to be an important question.
Opinion of Court
(4) Where a reference is made to the Court under subsection (1) or
(2), it is the duty of the Court to hear and consider it and to answer
each question so referred, and the Court shall certify to the Governor
in Council, for his information, its opinion on each question, with the
reasons for each answer, and the opinion shall be pronounced in like
manner as in the case of a judgment on an appeal to the Court, and
any judges who differ from the opinion of the majority shall in like
manner certify their opinions and their reasons. ...15

15

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 [hereinafter “Supreme Court Act”] (emphasis added).
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As McEvoy puts it: “[t]he will of Parliament is manifestly clear …
No margin of appreciation or discretion is conferred on the Court by its
organic document, the Supreme Court Act, to refuse to answer a
reference question.”16 Indeed, both the language of the reference power
and its purpose suggest the opposite of any sort of judicial discretion.
The Court has no role in determining the appropriateness of a question;
that is the province of the government. Although the power to refer
questions is styled as a discretion to refer “important questions of law or
fact”, it is for the government to determine the importance of a matter,
and there is a conclusive presumption that questions in accordance with
subsection (1) or (2) are important questions. Subsection (4) makes the
Court’s obligation clear: it is duty-bound to hear and consider reference
questions and must provide opinions with reasons in regard to each such
question.17
How does the Court deal with this problem? In short, it does not
deal with it at all. It simply ignores its statutory duty. The Court’s
reasons for refusing to answer the fourth question are essentially
pragmatic, policy-based considerations rather than legal justification.
The Court begins by begging the question as to its authority on a
reference question:
The first issue is whether this Court should answer the fourth question,
in the unique circumstances of this reference. This issue must be
approached on the basis that the answer to Question 4 may be positive
or negative; the preliminary analysis of the discretion not to answer a
reference question cannot be predicated on a presumed outcome. The
reference jurisdiction vested in this Court by s. 53 of the Supreme
Court Act is broad and has been interpreted liberally: see, e.g.,
Secession Reference, supra. The Court has rarely exercised its
discretion not to answer a reference question reflecting its perception
of the seriousness of its advisory role. 18

16

McEvoy, “Refusing to Answer”, supra, note 4, at 38.
Peter Hogg has acknowledged that the Supreme Court Act and the counterpart provincial
reference legislation “impose on the Court a duty to answer reference questions”. Nevertheless, he
does not challenge the Court’s asserted discretion not to answer. On the contrary, he expresses the
view that “the Court has not made sufficient use of its discretion not to answer a question posed on
a reference” (Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997,
updated in looseleaf) c. 8.6(d)) [Hogg, Constitutional Law].
18
Marriage Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 61 (emphasis added).
17
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Citation of the Secession Reference19 to establish the breadth and
liberal interpretation of the reference power is ironic. That was a case in
which the Court answered far more than it was asked, and essentially
presents the opposite problem: what is it that allows the Court to
supplement the questions it is asked pursuant to the reference
procedure?20
The suggestion that the Court has rarely exercised the discretion it
claims for itself is said to reflect the Court’s perception “of the
seriousness of its advisory role” rather than compliance with its
statutory duty. Plainly, the Court regards the performance of its advisory
role as a matter of its own prerogative as opposed to a statutory duty.
But the precedents the Court cites for refusing to answer reference
questions concern cases in which sufficient legal content was lacking, or
in which there were deficiencies in the question posed (ambiguity or
lack of precision) or inadequacies in the record. Arguably these are not
matters that give rise to a discretion at all; they are circumstances that in
effect preclude the Court from performing its statutory duty. That is,
they allow the Court to say: “we cannot answer the question posed”,
rather than “we refuse”.
The Court acknowledges the inaptness of the precedents to the
context of the Marriage Reference. This was not a case involving a
problematic question or an inadequate record. Nevertheless, the Court
asserts that the categories highlighted important considerations, but are
“not exhaustive”. According to the Court, the circumstances of the
Marriage Reference were unique, “the combined effect of which
persuades the Court that it would be unwise and inappropriate to answer
the question.”21
What were those circumstances? First, the Court noted the
government’s stated position that it would be proceeding to introduce
legislation regardless of the answer to the fourth question. According to
the Court, it followed that an opinion from the Court “serves no legal
purpose”.22 This would be a telling point if the Court had the discretion
it asserts, but the Court never establishes that it has the discretion it

19

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 is a famous
example of the Court not only asking and answering its own questions, but doing so in the context
of political conventions, which are legally unenforceable.
21
Marriage Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 64.
22
Id., at para. 65.
20
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exercises so it is simply irrelevant. The government was acting
disingenuously in pressing an unnecessary reference question, but that is
its statutory right. It is entitled to ask questions regardless of its
motivation for doing so, and the Court is duty-bound to answer.23
Even on its own, however, the Court’s position is problematic. The
concession it wrested from counsel during the oral argument — that the
government would be legislating regardless of the Court’s advice on the
fourth question — should have been irrelevant, since the Crown cannot
bind Parliament. The Crown is a supplicant for legislation: it introduces
bills, but cannot guarantee that Parliament will pass them. We may be
used to conflating “Parliament” and “government”, but even in the
context of a majority government it is not for the Court to assume that
the government can legislate at will. In any case, by the time the matter
was decided by the Court, the government was in a minority position. It
could not, in theory or in practice, ensure that Parliament would pass
same-sex marriage or any other legislation.
The Court then pursued a second objection, noting that rights had, in
effect, vested on the refusal of the government to appeal the decision in
previous litigation and its subsequent concessions in the other courts:
The parties in EGALE, Halpern and Hendricks have made this
intensely personal decision [to marry]. They have done so relying
upon the finality of the judgments concerning them. We are told that
thousands of couples have now followed suit. There is no compelling
basis for jeopardizing acquired rights, which would be a potential
outcome of answering Question 4.24

This concern was predictable;25 yet the Court’s view about the
undesirability of jeopardizing acquired rights is legally irrelevant since
Parliament has the ability to legislate retroactively, and may unwind
vested rights if it so chooses.26 If those rights were acquired improperly
in the first place, based on an erroneous interpretation of the Charter in
which the government acquiesced, why should it matter to the Court

23
This is another good reason why the reference power is problematic, quite apart from
the traditional reasons proffered by courts for refusing to perform advisory functions in
jurisdictions like the United States — but this is a topic for another occasion.
24
Id., at para. 67.
25
Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”, supra, note 5, at 262-63.
26
Parliament is only constitutionally disabled from retrospective legislation in the context
of the criminal law, as a result of s. 11(g) of the Charter. See British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco
Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, 2005 SCC 49.
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whether they would be jeopardized? The vesting of rights is something
that Parliament is properly expected to take into account in deciding
whether, and how, to legislate, but it is no legitimate concern of the
Court, even assuming that the Court has a discretionary power to refuse
to answer reference questions.
In effect, the Court’s refusal to answer entrenches the results of the
government’s litigation strategy in the lower courts. By refusing to
appeal Halpern and conceding unconstitutionality in the other provincial
courts, the government achieved a change in the law without legislating.
This would be recognized as a more pressing concern if the government
had changed hands rather than leaders; it is difficult to see how it is
legitimate for a successor government to be bound by the decisions of
its predecessor in this way, since the possibilities for abuse are so
great.27 In any event, the fourth question was germane to legislation that
would soon be debated in Parliament. The litigation decisions that
vested the rights of the couples who married were made by the Crown;
they did not bind Parliament.
The Court supplements its argument for refusing to answer by
noting that there is no precedent for answering a reference question in
circumstances where an appeal route has not been pursued. Here again,
however, this should be irrelevant: questions were referred to the Court
pursuant to an exercise of statutory power by the government. The
government has the discretion to use the reference procedure, and is
under no obligation to act in accordance with precedent in doing so.
The final point raised by the Court concerns the lack of efficacy of
the reference procedure, given the government’s intention of achieving
uniformity in regard to civil marriage across the country. According to
the Court, answering the fourth question had the potential to undermine
the uniformity the government’s proposed legislation would establish.
The uniformity argument succeeds only if the answer to Question 4 is
“no”. By contrast, a “yes” answer would throw the law into confusion.
The decisions of the lower courts in the matters giving rise to this
reference are binding in their respective provinces. They would be cast
27
For example, a government could vest the rights of claimants whose cause it supports by
purporting to concede unconstitutionality at any stage of litigation, and could do so in the
knowledge that it is likely to lose the next election. The notion that the successor government
should be disadvantaged by such a concession is deeply problematic, in my view, and a reason why
concessions of unconstitutionality should normally be inappropriate, especially in the context of
Charter challenges to legislation. See Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney-General and Charter
Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator” (1995) 5 N.J.C.L. 125.
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into doubt by an advisory opinion which expressed a contrary view,
even though it could not overturn them. The result would be
confusion, not uniformity. 28

The problem here is that any confusion that a “yes” answer to
question four would engender would be the government’s responsibility
to address. It is not for the Court to attempt to stave off political
controversy for the government — especially when the government has
engendered that controversy — and it is not obvious how a refusal to
answer the fourth question avoids political confusion in any event. The
government’s decision to legislate was tied to the assumed correctness
of the lower court decisions — the notion that the Charter required a
change in the definition of marriage. The Supreme Court’s decision to
refuse to answer the fourth question created confusion of a different
sort, by leaving open the possibility that the traditional definition of
marriage was constitutional after all.29
It is telling that the Court’s exercise of its purported discretion met
with neither resistance nor even criticism from the government. After
all, the government had insisted that the reference was required in order
to inform the debate that was to occur in Parliament. For its part, the
academic community was largely complimentary of the decision,
praising it as though it were an act of statesmanship.30
At the end of the day, however, it has to be asked whether refusing
to answer the fourth question was the right thing to do, even assuming
that the Court has the discretionary power it asserts.31 From the Court’s

28

Marriage Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 70.
As McEvoy notes, the circumstances that persuade the Court not to answer the fourth
question are all premised on the constitutionality of the traditional definition of marriage. McEvoy,
“Refusing to Answer”, supra, note 4, at 32.
30
Dean Patrick Monahan of Osgoode Hall Law School described the Court’s decision as
“a beautifully crafted judgment”: John Ibbitson, “Same-Sex Ruling: Here’s the Bottom Line: The
System Works” The Globe and Mail (10 December 2004) A8. Ibbitson paraphrases Jennifer
Koshan from the University of Calgary Faculty of Law as saying that the Court’s judgment
defended and upheld the Constitution, proving that the system works. Kirk Makin’s story in The
Globe and Mail also praised the decision: “Same-Sex Ruling: Analysis: Deft court crafts elegant
opinion” (10 December 2004) A7, quoting Professors Bruce Ryder and Alan Hutchinson of
Osgoode Hall Law School, and Professor Errol Mendes of the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law
(Common Law).
31
I emphasize the notion that the Court refused to answer because it is unlikely that the
various members of the Court refused to consider the question — that they did not even turn their
minds to it in light of their decision to refuse to provide an answer. I have no doubt that the
individual members of the Court considered the question, which makes the refusal to answer all the
more troubling.
29
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perspective there are only two possibilities: either the lower courts were
right in concluding that the traditional definition of marriage infringed
the Charter or they were wrong. If the Supreme Court thought that they
were right, what possible harm would there have been in saying so? 32 If,
on the other hand, the Supreme Court thought that the lower courts were
wrong — if it thought that the traditional definition of marriage did not
infringe the Charter — different considerations would have arisen. If the
lower courts were wrong, the consequence of the Court’s refusal to
answer the fourth question was to leave unchallenged a series of
erroneous decisions.33 That would be bad enough in terms of the
precedential value those decisions might come to have, but the impact of
the lower court decisions went well beyond their precedential value:
they informed a series of political decisions that had been made, and
would inform the votes that were to be held in Parliament. A decision
that the traditional definition of marriage did not infringe the Charter
would undoubtedly have caused some Members of Parliament to change
their minds, and the outcome of the political process might have been
different. No doubt, there would have been significant political upheaval
in the short run, but nothing that could not have been managed in the
ordinary political processes.
Every decision of the Supreme Court that interprets the Constitution
has political consequences — both intended and unintended — because
every such decision creates incentives and disincentives for political
action. It is impossible for the Court to act apolitically where the
Constitution is concerned, and the Marriage Reference must be
understood in this light. It is clear that the government sought to use the
reference procedure and the Court for political purposes. It should be

32

Irwin Cotler acknowledges only that the Court did not “directly” answer the fourth
question. See Cotler, “Evolution or Revolution”, supra, note 14, at 63. He argues that the Court
“affirm[ed] the constitutionality of the government’s approach” (at 63), but as I have said this was
never in doubt. The only significant question was whether or not the traditional definition of
marriage was inconsistent with the Charter, and the Court pointedly refused to answer. The Court
did say this about the government’s proposal to legislate to change the law of marriage to include
same-sex couples: “far from violating the Charter, [it] flows from it” (Marriage Reference, supra,
note 1, at para. 43). But any proposal to extend rights by legislation arguably flows from the
Charter. Whether or not such an extension is required by the Charter is a different question. Cf.
Cameron, “Mixed Messages”, supra, note 4, at 20.
33
Of course, a decision on a reference question is advisory only, and cannot overrule a
lower court decision. Nevertheless, as Hogg notes, decisions on reference questions are treated like
ordinary decisions of the Court despite their advisory character. See Hogg, Constitutional Law,
supra, note 17, at c. 8.6(d).
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equally clear that the Court used the reference to advance its own
political purposes. The Court has sent the message that while the
government can initiate the reference procedure, the Court defines the
constitutional role it is willing to play, and performs its statutory
advisory duty in accordance with that role. In short, the Court will
decide whether, and to what extent, it will advise the government.
Successive governments have acquiesced in the Court’s conception
of its role in the reference procedure. The consequence is that, despite
the terms of the Supreme Court Act, governments refer questions to the
Court at their peril.34
2. The Politics of Health Care
In the past few years the shortcomings of the Canadian health care
system have seemed glaring: soaring costs and extensive waiting lists
are prominent problems. Senate reports, a Royal Commission, two
federal and several provincial elections have propelled health care to the
top of the list of political concerns. It was only a matter of time until the
Supreme Court was asked to enter the fray, and it did so in Chaoulli.
Chaoulli concerned the claim of Mr. Zeliotis, a patient in the public
health system who had experienced a number of health problems, and
Dr. Chaoulli, a physician who sought to operate outside the public
system. They argued that Quebec legislation prohibiting the sale and
purchase of private health insurance infringed section 7 of the Charter.
They were unsuccessful at trial and in the Quebec Court of Appeal but
prevailed in the Supreme Court of Canada, which allowed the appeal in
a fractured 4:3 decision. Three judges held that the Quebec law
infringed section 7 of the Charter and could not be justified under
section 1; three judges held that there was no section 7 infringement;
and one judge expressed no opinion on section 7, holding that the law
infringed the Quebec Charter and that it was unnecessary to consider the
Canadian Charter in the circumstances.

34
John McEvoy describes the Court as a “fickle friend” for this reason. He goes on to
argue that the Court’s refusal to answer reference questions must be understood as a judgment that
the statutory duty to answer reference questions is unconstitutional (McEvoy, “Refusing to
Answer”, supra, note 4, at 40). This is an important argument that I cannot consider here. I note
only that so long as the federal government continues to acquiesce, the Court will not have to
ground the discretionary authority it claims in constitutional form.
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The decision in Chaoulli caught many by surprise, presumably
because they supposed that medicare was sacred, and as a result
essentially immune from judicial review. But Chaoulli is not the first
case in which the Court has used its judicial review authority under the
Charter to venture into “sacred” territory and it will not be the last: there
are no categorical limits to the scope of judicial review under the
Charter. There is no Charter right to health care per se, but the Court
interprets the Charter as a “living tree” and may extend constitutional
protection to additional rights from time to time.35
I raise Chaoulli not to discuss the Court’s approach to section 7,36
but instead to consider what the decision says about how the Court
perceives its role in the constitutional order. Two questions come to
mind. First, why did the Court agree to hear Chaoulli in the first place?
Second, having decided to hear the case, why was the Court unable to
reach a majority decision on the Charter question?
(a) Why Did the Court Grant Leave to Appeal?
No reasons are given when leave to appeal is granted, but they are not
difficult to discern from the decisions in the case. The judges who
granted leave all voted to overturn the impugned legislation,37 and their
remarks in doing so are telling.
Justice Deschamps’ decision makes clear that, in her view,
government had been given more than enough time to solve the
problems of delay in the health care system, and that it was time for the
Court to take charge:
The government had plenty of time to act. Numerous commissions
have been established… and special or independent committees have
published reports. … Governments have promised on numerous
occasions to find a solution to the problem of waiting lists. Given the

35

Christopher Manfredi’s observation is apt: “[T]here is now an established principle that
there is no policy dispute that the Court cannot resolve if it chooses to do so.” Manfredi, “Déjà vu
All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of Judicial Policymaking” in Colleen Flood, Kent Roach,
& Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2005) 139, at 149 [Flood et al., Access to Care]. See Grant Huscroft, “A Constitutional Work in
Progress? The Charter and the Limits of Progressive Interpretation” in G. Huscroft & I. Brodie,
eds., Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004), at 413 (also
in 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 413).
36
See the various contributions to Flood et al., Access to Care, id.
37
Leave to appeal was granted May 9, 2003 (McLachlin C.J., Bastarache and Deschamps JJ.).
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tendency to focus the debate on a sociopolitical philosophy, it seems
that governments have lost sight of the urgency of taking concrete
action. The courts are therefore the last line of defence for citizens. 38

Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. reiterate the usual line taken
by the Chief Justice in defending the Court against charges of judicial
activism: the Court is the guardian of the Constitution; it cannot shirk its
duty to hear claims that constitutional rights have been breached. They
put the point this way:
The fact that the matter is complex, contentious or laden with social
values does not mean that the courts can abdicate the responsibility
vested in them by our Constitution to review legislation for Charter
compliance when citizens challenge it. As this Court has said on a
number of occasions, “it is the high duty of this Court to insure that
the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their constitutional
mandate and engage in the illegal exercise of power”. 39

This overstates and oversimplifies things considerably, of course,
since the notion of illegality suggests a black and white world where
rights are concerned — legal and illegal legislation, easily recognized as
such. The real contest in Charter cases is not between legislatures intent
on denying rights and courts charged with protecting them, but instead
between different conceptions of Charter rights — good faith
disagreements about rights and reasonable limits.40
In truth, the Court is selective in exercising its role as guardian of
the Constitution. The Court controls its docket; it hears only the Charter
cases it wants to hear based on the Court’s perception as to the
importance of those cases.41 The Court might well have expected that it
would have to enter the health care debate eventually, but why choose
Chaoulli as the entry point? After all, Chaoulli was not a case in which
the Court was required to resolve conflicts in Charter interpretation
across the country. Charter challenges to the health care system were
only beginning to make their way through the courts in most other
provinces. Those courts were not bound by the Quebec Court of

38

Chaoulli, supra, note 2, at para. 96.
Id., at para. 107.
40
This is a recurring theme in Jeremy Waldron’s work. See Law and Disagreement
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
41
Supreme Court Act, supra, note 15, s. 40(1). See Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”, supra,
note 5, at 263-65. The Court is required to hear some criminal law appeals as of right, and in
addition must accept reference questions.
39
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Appeal’s decision in Chaoulli, and might well have expounded different
understandings of section 7 in future litigation. Why not wait, then, for a
body of law to develop in the other provinces?
The argument for granting leave to appeal in Chaoulli would have
been stronger had the outcome in the Quebec courts been different; it is
difficult to allow a provincial appellate court to have the last word when
it comes to making law based on the Charter. But the Charter challenge
was unsuccessful in Quebec courts, and as a result the status quo in
health care had not been altered. Putting the worst face on things, a
decision to deny leave to appeal would have left standing a wellestablished public health system that was the product of democratic
processes, and was amenable to democratic reform. The decision of the
Quebec Court of Appeal would have fallen into the range of cases with
no definitive precedential value — neither approved by the Supreme
Court nor overturned.
In my view the prudent course would have been to deny leave to
appeal in Chaoulli, thus allowing the issues to percolate across the
country. That is, in fact, one of the chief benefits of a federal system:
different provincial approaches to health care can be considered in
different provincial courts. The Supreme Court could have allowed that
process to unfold in the knowledge that eventually it would adjudicate a
better-informed case. In the meantime, ongoing political processes
would have continued. On the best-case scenario, political reform might
have ameliorated some of the problems in health care, perhaps obviating
the need for Charter litigation. The cost of denying leave to appeal in
Chaoulli was, at worst, a delay before the Court would enter the fray.
(b) Why Was the Court Unable to Reach a Majority Decision on the
Charter Question?
Having decided to hear the case, the Court took a full year to render its
decision but was unable to reach a majority decision on the alleged
breach of the Charter. What are we to make of this?
Plainly, the Court was in a difficult position. The resignations of
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. meant that it was operating at less than full
strength. A narrow majority one way or the other on something as
important as health care might well have done more harm than good.
For all of the bluster about the Court’s special role as guardian of the
Constitution, that role is difficult to justify when decisions on
constitutionality hinge on a single vote: if the constitutional issues are so
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finely balanced, why should the decision of a bare majority of justices
be preferred to that of the elected branch of government?42 Beyond this,
however, loomed a more practical consideration: with two vacancies to
be filled, it was always possible that a 4:3 ruling might not be supported
by the Court when it reached full strength. That would be embarrassing
for the Court, to say the very least, and was no doubt something the
Court wished to avoid.
Now, there is no obligation for the Court to hold open even the most
controversial issues simply because it is not at full strength; the Court
has made law in a number of Charter cases with less than full-strength
benches.43 But there is no doubt that the Court prefers to deal with
important matters with a full bench and, what is more, with strong
majority judgments — better still, unanimity — whenever possible.
That was not to be in Chaoulli, however; the Court was divided on
the principles of fundamental justice, a division inspired by different
conceptions as to the respective roles of the legislature and the courts.
This is the context in which Deschamps J. refused to cast the
deciding vote on the Canadian Charter argument. She chose to decide
the case exclusively under the Quebec Charter, and her reasons for
doing so are far from convincing. The Court’s decision to grant leave
signalled that it was a case of national importance, and the involvement
of so many provincial and national bodies as interveners underscored
this point. The case had been argued as a violation of the Canadian
Charter from the outset, and dealt with by the lower courts on that basis.
Even assuming the logical priority of the Quebec Charter, refusing to
say anything on what had always been regarded as the central issue in
the case is incongruous — especially in the face of McLachlin C.J.’s
insistence that courts could not “abdicate the responsibility vested in
them by our Constitution to review legislation for Charter compliance
when citizens challenge it”.44 The best that can be said of Deschamps
J.’s non-decision is that it precluded the Court from reaching a majority
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This is a large point I cannot do justice to here. See Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the
Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346.
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R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (5:2); Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (3:2) and R. v. Keegstra,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (4:3), are prominent examples.
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decision on the Charter, leaving section 7 to be argued another day
before a full court in different circumstances.45
Still, the political landscape has been altered by the Court’s
decision; politicians are on notice that the Court may intervene in the
health care debate, and the outcome of that intervention is uncertain.
Chaoulli creates both incentives and disincentives for political reform,
and these must be taken into account even where there is room for
ordinary legislation.
The difficulties in legislating — let alone invoking the
notwithstanding clause — are usually understated by proponents of
dialogue theory, and as a result I have argued that the Court should be
more reticent to decide constitutional issues than it is.46 The Court
should, in other words, take responsibility for keeping judicial review in
check, lest it become the dominant feature of our constitutional order.
The Court has, however, often expressed the contrary view: judicial
review is said to be necessary because politicians cannot be counted on.
The point is neatly captured in Lamer C.J.’s candid interview with the
press, in which he exclaimed:
Thank God we’re here. It’s not for me to criticize legislators but if
they choose not to legislate, that’s their doing. If they prefer to leave it
up to the court that’s their choice. But a problem is not going to go
away because legislators aren’t dealing with it. People say we’re
activist, but we’re doing our job.47

Supporters of dialogue theory have, for the most part, lauded the
Court for its courage in addressing Charter issues in controversial
circumstances.48 Prior to Chaoulli, Kent Roach expressed the view that

45

It is difficult not to be suspicious of Deschamps J.’s reasons for refusing to decide the
Charter question. As Jamie Cameron puts it, “Whether by design or not, the division is strategic,
because it leaves the status of the Charter claim unresolved, thereby preserving the question of
section 7’s interpretation for the full Court to decide.” (Cameron, “Mixed Messages”, supra, note 4,
at 26.) Lorraine Weinrib asserts that a majority of the Court can be taken to have decided the
Charter question since Deschamps J.’s decision addressed a parallel protection in the Quebec
Charter. See Lorraine Weinrib, “Charter Perspectives on Chaoulli: The Body and the Body Politic”
in Flood et al., Access to Care, supra, note 35, 56 at 57. But it is inappropriate to extrapolate a
majority decision on the Charter in the face of Deschamps J.’s clear and deliberate refusal to
address the issue, however similar the provisions in the respective charters may be.
46
Huscroft, “Judicial Exclusivity”, supra, note 5, at 263-66.
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Quoted in Janice Tibbetts, “Politicians Duck Divisive Issues, Chief Justice says” The
National Post (July 12, 1999), at A1.
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Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) [Roach, Supreme
Court on Trial].
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techniques designed to avoid ruling on questions of constitutionality —
Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues”49 and Cass Sunstein’s “judicial
minimalism”50 — are irrelevant in the Canadian context, and that their
use is tantamount to a dereliction of the Court’s duty.51 Chaoulli has
prompted him to qualify his opposition, however, at least in regard to
section 7 cases. He regards the Court’s approach to section 7 of the
Charter as erroneous,52 and argues that the Court has essentially read
section 1 out of section 7 — it has precluded the ability of governments
to justify an infringement of section 7 in all but emergency situations,
and so compromised the ability to engage in the dialogue he advocates.53
I do not share Roach’s concern in regard to the interpretation of
section 7. It has always been more difficult to justify limits on some
rights than others, and the case for judicial modesty in constitutional
interpretation is strong quite apart from cases involving rights that are
subject to definitional balancing. I am afraid that much of the criticism
of the decision in Chaoulli stems not from principled concerns about the
scope of judicial review, but instead from having one’s ox gored.54
Many of the strongest proponents of judicial review abhor private health
care and are deeply disturbed by the result in Chaoulli. As a result, they
are now in the unfamiliar position of counselling judicial restraint.55
Chief Justice McLachlin’s rhetoric in defending the Court against
critics of “judicial activism” precludes her from taking a more modest

49
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) c. 4.
50
Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
51
Roach, Supreme Court on Trial, supra, note 48, at 147-52.
52
Kent Roach, “The Courts and Medicare: Too Much or Too Little Judicial Activism?” in
Flood et al., Access to Care, supra, note 35, 184, at 189.
53
Roach also questions whether it was appropriate for the Court to have granted standing
in Chaoulli. See id., at 186-89. Christopher Manfredi, who has consistently been concerned with
the judicial role, has also expressed doubts about the Court’s decision to grant standing in Chaoulli:
Manfredi, “Déjà vu All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of Judicial Policymaking” in Access to
Care, supra, note 35, 139, at 147.
54
In my view there is no breach of the principles of fundamental justice in Chaoulli, and I
hasten to add that my ox has not been gored — I am not opposed in principle to private health care.
55
See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, “Worse than Lochner?” in Flood et al., Access to Care, supra,
note 35, 75. Kent Roach expresses dismay that the Court has not been sufficiently generous in using
s. 7 to protect rights, but plainly he prefers some rights to others: “[T]he Court has been cautious,
often too cautious, in recognizing rights under s. 7. Alas not in Chaoulli.” Roach, id., at 190 in
Flood et al., Access to Care (emphasis added). In a footnote reference Roach suggests a preference
for generous interpretation of s. 7 where social welfare rights are concerned, provided that
justification under s. 1 is possible (id., at 202, note 24).
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position in Chaoulli. Her only concession to the political nature of the
case is the understated acknowledgment that the health care issue “may
have policy ramifications”.56 Even Binnie and LeBel JJ., who
acknowledge that “a correct balance must be struck between the
judiciary and the other branches of government”, and that “[e]ach
branch must respect the limits of its institutional role”,57 give short shrift
to arguments about justiciability. They categorically reject the notion of
a political questions doctrine, and accept that the appellants had a
sufficient interest to be granted standing to bring the case.
It is easy to deprecate constitutional avoidance mechanisms, but if
their use is to be disavowed proponents of judicial review must take the
bad with the good. Chief Justice Dickson’s admonition from R. v.
Edwards Books and Art Ltd.58 — that in interpreting and applying the
Charter “the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does not simply
become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll back
legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of
less advantaged persons” — is of little use as an interpretive principle.59
If, as Binnie and LeBel JJ. argue, the Court has blundered into health
care and created a nebulous “reasonable care within a reasonable time”
standard60 — then the only real check on the Court is its confidence in
its institutional competence to decide future health care cases.
The signs from Chaoulli are disquieting. Justice Deschamps’
remarks in the context of assessing the level of deference required
suggest overconfidence where caution is required. She acknowledges
56
Chaoulli, supra, note 2, at para. 108. She adds immediately that this “does not permit us
to avoid answering” the Charter question.
57
Id., at para. 184.
58
[1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 136 [hereinafter “Edwards Books”].
59
It is in the nature of rights litigation that there will be winners and losers, but Dickson
C.J.’s admonition seems to suggest that the Court should perform its judicial review function with a
thumb on the social justice side of the scale, as the Court sees it. Who are the less advantaged, and
how are they to be determined? And how much weight can disadvantage be given in any event if
Charter rights are at stake? Cf. Choudhry, supra, note 55, at 91 (describing Dickson C.J.’s
admonition as a “general interpretive principle” and a “decisive repudiation of Lochner era
libertarianism”). According to Choudhry, Edwards Books was “directly relevant” to the approach
the Court should have taken in interpreting s. 7. He adds: “The lesson from Edwards Books may be
that when the state legislates to ensure that constitutional rights have equal value, courts should be
reluctant to intervene” (at 92).
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when they say “It is to be hoped that we will know it when we see it.” This invokes Potter Stewart
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define the sorts of sexually explicit material unprotected by the First Amendment, “[b]ut I know it
when I see it”.
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the substantial differences of opinion when it comes to health care
policy, but insists that “[t]he courts are an appropriate forum for a
serious and complete debate”,61 and quotes the following claim with
approval:
[C]ourts do not have to define goals, choose means or come up with
ideas. They do not have to create social policies; they just have to
understand what the other branches have created. No special expertise
is required for such an understanding.62

I think that this seriously underestimates the nature of the task at
hand, and at the same time overestimates judicial expertise. There are
important questions here beyond institutional competence that go to
democratic legitimacy, but they are largely ignored.

II. CONCLUSION
The Marriage Reference and Chaoulli are the decisions of a Court that
is self-defining of its role in constitutional litigation, and as a result its
place in the constitutional order. The extent to which either decision will
prompt debate about the role of the Court, and the impact that debate
will have on the Court, remains to be seen.
The Court cannot help but notice how politicized Charter litigation
has become. One of the interesting developments in the Marriage
Reference and Chaoulli concerns the involvement of politicians as
interveners in Charter litigation. Two politicians were allowed to
intervene in the Marriage Reference, a Senator and a Member of
Parliament,63 and 10 Senators were granted intervener status in
Chaoulli.64 The participation of politicians in Charter litigation confirms
some of the worst fears about the impact of judicial review on the
political process: some politicians may have decided that more can be
accomplished through Charter litigation than through the democratic
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political processes.65 This is not a sign of a healthy democratic
constitutional order, and the Court would do well to reflect on this as it
continues to define its constitutional role.

65

Manfredi makes the same point in his contribution to Flood et al., Access to Care,
supra, note 35, at 155.

